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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Both theoretical and empirical literature has identified several channels through which 
FDI influence economic growth in Latin America. This study however examines the 
impact on economic output growth using aggregate production function augmented with 
FDI inflows, policy reforms and the interaction between the two for 22 Latin American 
countries over 1980-2006 period. The results demonstrate the importance of FDI inflows 
and policy reforms on economic output growth. Though the interaction between the two 
highlights complimentary affect, the results are not significant. On the other hand, both 
FDI and reforms influence economic growth only post 1990s, the period in which many 
Latin American countries initiated drastic economic policy reforms. Despite these 
positive outcomes, the coefficient of FDI on economic growth is found to be smaller. 
This is because, though absolute FDI inflows have increased in the region over the years, 
the rate of growth of FDI in comparison to other developing regions like Asia is very 
low. The share of Latin American FDI to total developing countries declined from 1970 
to 2006.  This suggests that even though there is a positive impact of FDI and policy 
reforms on economic growth, this effect is only marginal and Latin America as an 
investment destination is less attractive than other developing regions like Asia today.  
 
Keywords: FDI; Economic growth; Policy reforms; Latin America 
 
JEL classification: 
 
 
* The DO FILES of the empirical results can be obtained from Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati 
(corresponding author) on request at: kc_dcm@yahoo.co.in 
 
 
 2
1. Introduction 
 
It is disappointing to see Latin America making inadequate progress in the last three 
decades especially in comparison to other developing regions like Asia and Middle East. 
The average percapita GDP growth rate during 1970 to 2007 in Latin America region was 
1.50% in comparison to 2.56% in Asia and 2.86% in Developing countries (World Bank, 
2007). In fact, amongst all the regions, Latin America’s average percapita GDP growth 
from 1970 – 2007 was only ahead of 1% average growth of Africa. The problem with 
previous years was a low growth of GDP, “typical Latin rate of growth” which resulted 
in low percapita income growth. The average GDP of Latin America between 1970 and 
1980 grew by 3.68% and average annual percapita GDP growth during this period was 
3.22%. This was one of the highest growth rates amongst all the regions in the world 
(including all developing countries). In next decade (1981 – 1990), the GDP growth rate 
grew at 1.84% and the result was negative growth in percapita GDP, -0.75%. The 
performance of Latin America was the worst during this period. Even Africa registered a 
growth rate of -0.32%, higher than Latin region. For a developing region like Latin 
America, this growth was inadequate to make any significant impact on overall 
socioeconomic development. The low growth during the decade was largely attributed to 
the oil, debt and financial crisis. Often, this period is widely known as “the lost decade” 
in Latin American growth story. Some initiation was taken up during the 1980s by most 
of the Latin American governments in implementing market reforms. This improved the 
average GDP growth rate during 1991 – 2000 to 2.41% and the average percapita GDP 
also recovered to 1.62%. More countries initiated reforms post 2000 as the region grew 
on an average at 4.66% with percapita GDP growth of 1.89% during 2001 to 2007. 
However, despite this, Latin American growth during this period was again the lowest 
amongst all developing regions, including Africa, which had a growth rate of 2.43% 
(WDI, World Bank, 2007).  
 
Thus, the biggest challenge before the Latin American countries is how to attain a solid 
economic growth and more importantly how to sustain it in order to trickle down its 
benefits to the poor to improve their socioeconomic conditions? Increasing economic 
growth is extremely important for Latin America to improve its poor socio economic 
conditions. Many economists like Maddison (2001) opine that this can be attained by a 
massive increase in investments which should result in sustained economic welfare in the 
years to come. For that, the overall investment levels should be increased substantially 
from the present levels in future. In his study he shows how some of the emerging 
economies achieved an economic growth rate of over 6 to 8% by significantly increasing 
their investment rate. However, in the case of Latin America, given the fact that the 
economic growth has slowed down, pushing for higher levels of annual savings and 
domestic investments will be difficult. This apart, majority of the countries are already 
reeling under external debt and rising funds through more debt meaning walking straight 
into a ‘debt trap’. Therefore, FDI as an investment financing source becomes very 
important for the region which can supplement the domestic investable resources for 
attaining a higher economic growth rates.  FDI not only allows overcoming the financing 
and liquidity constraints, but also provide new capital, allowing additional investment in 
both human and physical capital, which can be very beneficial for developing countries 
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like Latin America. It is also believed that FDI inflows are generally a means to 
incorporate new knowledge from abroad. The inflow of new knowledge may benefit 
local firms through imitation and learning (Findlay, 1978; Mansfield and Romeo, 1980; 
Blomström, 1986), providing employment to the local people, increased competition in 
local markets, facilitation of human capital mobility among firms (Fosfuri et al., 2001; 
Glass and Saggi, 2002) and increase the productivity thereby higher economic growth 
rates (see Rao et. al., 2009 for literature review on FDI vs growth relationship).  
 
In the beginning, Latin America benefited from the surge in FDI inflows into developing 
countries. The FDI inflows into Latin America were 16 US$ bn in 1970, which was about 
42% share in developing countries FDI inflows. Throughout the 1970s, Latin America 
had attracted good amount of FDI inflows because some of the huge investments were 
made some natural resources based countries during and following the oil crisis in 1973. 
In 1980, Latin America could attract FDI inflows worth 65 US$ mn. The average FDI 
inflows in 1980s (1980 to 1990) was around 68 US$ bn. In 1990, the FDI inflows in 
Latin America was about 97 US$ bn. This means, an increase in FDI inflows of just 32 
US$ mn. Its share in developing countries also kept declining. In 1990, the share of Latin 
American FDI inflows to developing countries was 27%. The FDI inflows surged in 
Latin America through out the 1990s. The average inflows of FDI from 1991 to 2000 was 
508 US$ bn. This was 440 US$ bn higher than the average FDI inflows during 1981 to 
1990 and 476 US$ bn of average FDI inflows between 1970 and 1980. This surge was 
mainly because liberalization of economies in post 1990s. In 2000, Latin America 
attracted FDI inflows worth 978 US$ bn but its share shrank to 38% in developing 
countries. Post-2000, FDI inflows increased rapidly in Latin America, though not up to 
the expectation levels when compared with other developing regions like East and South 
Asia. In 2006, FDI inflows in Latin region stood at 837 US$ bn but its share in 
developing countries came down to 22%. A comparison of FDI share of Latin America to 
Asia in developing countries is presented in graph 1.  
 
Though the FDI inflows in the recent years have increased in Latin America, its share in 
developing countries has considerably declined over the years. The graph 1 shows that 
there is an exact divergent movement in the share of FDI of Latin America vis-à-vis Asia. 
Post-1980s Asian FDI share in developing countries has surged compared to Latin 
America whose share has declined. While the share of Latin region declined from 42% in 
1970 to 22% in 2006, Asia’s share has gone up considerably from 21% in 1970 to 70% in 
2006. Many theorists have pointed out various reasons for the loss of Latin America’s 
international competitiveness. Some argue that Latin America lost the race to other 
regions like Asia because of the presence of natural resources which had significant 
negative impact of Dutch disease1. Dietz (1992) argue that it is economic reforms which 
made the difference between the two regions both in terms of attracting FDI and 
stimulating economic growth rate. But increasing number of researchers in the recent past 
have highlighted that it is not the reforms per se but the ‘quality of reforms’ which made 
the difference between the two regions.   
                                                  
1 Dutch disease occurs when booming primary commodity exports cause a massive inflow of foreign 
exchange and lead to appreciation of local currency, thus reducing international competitiveness of the 
country (Corden, 1984).  
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Graph 1 
 
In fact, whatever increase in FDI inflows post 1990s was largely attributed to the 
consolidation of the economic reform programs like: privatization, trade liberalization, 
streamlining and simplification of FDI policies, industrial and public sector reforms 
initiated by many Latin American countries. In majority of the country-years higher 
economic reforms brought higher FDI inflows into the region. Thus, the role of economic 
reforms in promoting FDI inflows is vital in terms of the impact it could have on 
economic growth.  To this end, the impact of overall government policy reforms on FDI 
and its interaction with the economic output growth of the host country has not been 
analyzed so far in the case of Latin American countries. Taking the case of 22 Latin 
American countries for the period 1980 to 20062, we explore the linkages between 
government policy reforms, FDI inflows and economic output growth. There is a general 
perception which is widely recognized that countries may benefit from FDI inflows only 
if the government policy reforms are initiated. If the government policies are rigid, 
marked with higher restrictions, regulations and lower incentives, high bureaucratic 
procedures and rules and regulations for business operations, restrictive labour laws, 
enforcement of contracts and so on and so forth would not only hinder growth and 
development in the host country but would also affect productivity and human capital as 
allocation of resources to other sectors becomes restrictive.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with model specification 
derived from Solow (1956) growth accounting framework. Section 3 presents some 
important stylized facts. While, 4 discuss empirical results, section 5 concludes the study. 
 
                                                  
2 The choice of the study period was determined by limited availability of the data and by the desire to 
gather a balanced pool of data for as many Latin countries as possible, see annexure 1. 
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2. Model Specifications 
 
Let the aggregate production function at time t be: 
 
 
 
Where, Y, K, L, denote: output; physical capital and labour respectively. Besides the 
factor inputs, we also account for the “state of the economy” and “some unexplained 
technological efficiency gains” of the basic production function. This is reflected in 
equation (1) as A(t). This also measure of technical change in output per period. A(t) 
measures the proportionate change in output per period when input level are held 
constant. 
 
Dividing the above function by L and introducing logs equation (1) would become: 
 
 
 
 
 
The estimation of this equation yields values of (α + β) and A. A is the value of technical 
progress which is the rate of technological change. Sum of the partial elasticities (α + β) 
indicates the extent of economies or diseconomies to scale. The returns to scale are 
constant, increasing or decreasing if the value of (α + β) is equal to one, more than one or 
less than one respectively.  
 
Introducing convergence into the equation yields: 
 
 
 
 
 
In the equation (3) how and where do “FDI” and “Policy Reforms” would fit? 
 
As described above, A(t) reflects two components. Following Bassanini et al. (2001) we 
assume the first component as δ(t) which reflects the state of the economy, measured by 
important policy variables like: policy reforms; trade openness; inflation and state 
vulnerability. The second component include ψ(t) which reflects other unexplained 
sources which the model here does not explicitly capture. This in growth theory is called 
as “exogenous technology progress”.  
 
Thus, 
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Where,  
 
 
                                                                                                    
 
Where, PVt in equation (5) is the different policy variables measuring the state of the 
economy. ψ(t) is the level of stock of technology, which in turn is dependent on the initial 
level of technology, ψ(t0).  
 
In the above equation (2) there is no distinction between domestic capital stock and 
foreign capital. It is assumed that FDI would be considered as an addition to existing 
capital stock. If this were the case, then it would become difficult to gauge its impact on 
growth performance. The role of FDI has become crucial as it provides new capital, 
allowing additional investments in human as well as physical capital, which can be 
beneficial for developing countries which are capital scarce. Most importantly, FDI is 
widely seen as a means of transferring and incorporating new knowledge from outside 
the country. The theory of MNE argues that foreign firms possess the technological 
advantage over the local firms which result is reduction in their cost of operations abroad 
(Caves, 1996). If this theory holds, then FDI could very well lead to externalities on the 
domestic production factors. The inflow of new knowledge like: greater production 
methods; new technologies; organizational and managerial techniques; management and 
marketing skills and activities may benefit domestic firms through imitation, increased 
competition, mobility of human capital from foreign firms to domestic firms, thereby 
leading to increase in overall productivity levels (Findlay, 1978; Blomstrom, 1986; 
Markusen & Venables, 1999; Glass & Saggi, 2002). On the other hand, the developing 
countries are keen to attract FDI not only because of the diffusion effects of ideas and 
innovations but would also provide access to the modern technologies. This is because 
not only the greater part of world’s R&D spending comes from MNCs but they also 
possess control over much advanced production techniques. Thus, higher FDI inflows 
coming from advanced countries would lead to increase in the rate of technological 
progress in host country and hence greater the rate of output growth (Wang, 1990; Ram 
& Zhang 2002; Peri & Urban 2006).  
 
The above arguments suggest that any increase in foreign capital would show up in A(t). 
Increase in foreign capital not only includes mere quantity but also the quality of the 
capital stock. The economic theory has modeled the development of capital stock in three 
different ways. One, Solow (1956) model of “capital widening” which is mere 
accumulation of capital through increase in quantitative production of existing capital 
goods. Two, Aghion & Howitt (1992) model of “technology change” focus is on 
improving the quality of existing type of capital goods. Three, Romer (1990) model of 
“technology change” deals with increasing the variety of new type of capital goods3. All 
these three channels of capital stock improvements contribute economic growth through 
production function. Thus, if A(t) is not growing, it is presumed that most of the economic 
                                                  
3 Both Aghion & Howitt (1992) and Romer (1990) models are called “capital deepening” models. The 
former is called “capital deepening via quality improvement” and the later is known as “capital deepening 
via increase in the variety of capital goods”. 
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growth is coming from mere accumulation of foreign capital stock and not due to its 
quality. This is in line with the current position of many other developing countries that 
are in the stage of capital accumulation4. It is argued that countries which open up their 
markets for FDI will first experience an increase in foreign capital stock. In later stages 
once the capital accumulation has been established, the major part of the FDI will then be 
associated with improving the quality of existing foreign capital stock in the country. The 
accumulation of FDI inflows stock can easily be observed in the case of Latin American 
countries especially in the last two decade. In future, this accumulated stock will be 
driven by the quality improvements. Thus, currently, at least in the case of Latin 
American countries, it can be formulated that the economic growth is largely driven by 
accumulation of capital stock.  
 
According to these theoretical groundings, we assume that the level of A(t) depends on the 
initial stock of A(t0) :    and the externalities from FDI inflows:   
 
Thus,     
 
 
 
 
Replacing equation (6) into (3) gives: 
 
 
 
 
Denoting by Y; K; FDI for , respectively we get: 
 
 
 
 
In order to gain access to such advanced technologies provided by MNCs to reach a 
higher output growth, the host countries are engaged in attracting FDI by ushering policy 
reforms. Policy reforms are crucial because they provide incentives and relax restrictions 
thereby promoting FDI. This allows reallocation of human and physical capital in 
productive sectors and help increase productivity related to exploitation of technology 
spillovers from FDI inflows (Egger, 2003 and Whyman & Baimbridge, 2006). In such 
cases, the studies by Rodriguez & Rodrik (2000) and Winters (2004) have argued for a 
conditional variable in measuring for such effects on economic growth. Similarly we 
                                                  
4 It should be noted that though FDI inflows are flowing into many developing countries since 1970s, it was 
only in late 1980s and early 1990s the FDI inflows have actually started to surge. This surge can mostly be 
attributed to the policy reforms which most of the governments have initiated during this period. 
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assume that the policy reforms played a crucial role in influencing FDI inflows in African 
region. Thus, we condition FDI inflows with Economic Policy Reforms. Let this 
conditionality variable be: REF(t). The extended specification based on equation (8) is:  
 
 
 
 
Having laid theoretical foundations for the empirical analysis by introducing FDI into the 
aggregate production function along with policy reforms variables as highlighted by 
Bassanini et al. (2001), several forms the equation (9) will now be estimated using the 
two-way Random. This method is used because of the possible unobservable effects 
(Baltagi, 2005). We regard these effects as random and applied two-way random effects 
estimator which implied that the unobservable effects were part of the disturbance and 
therefore independent of the observable explanatory variables. Another reason for usage 
of two-way random effects is because of the collinearity with time-invariant or largely 
time-invariant regressors (Beck, 2001). Also, it is not sure whether the unobservable 
effects are fixed or otherwise, i.e. they do or do not vary by country and time?  The 
pooled time-series cross-sectional (TCSC) data may exhibit Heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation problems. While these problems do not bias the estimated coefficients as 
pooled regression analysis in itself is a more robust method for large sample consisting of 
cross section and time series data. However, they often tend to cause biased standard 
errors for coefficients, producing invalid statistical inferences. To deal with these 
problems, we estimated for all the models the White robust standard errors clustered over 
countries. These estimated standard errors are robust to both Heteroskedasticity and to a 
general type of serial correlation within the cross-section unit (Rogers, 1993 and 
Williams, 2000). The equation (8) and (9) runs over T observations, t = 1…..T periods 
and applies to all the sample countries i = 1…..N. Attaching country specific indices i to 
each variable and adding an error term leads to the following econometric formulation: 
 
 
 
Where,  
 
Where, Δ Yit is the dependent variable measured as change in GDP growth of the 
working age population (20-65) in 2000 US$ constant at PPP in country i at year t. Going 
by the economic growth theory, we replace traditional measure of population with 
working age population because the later is much closer to L (labour input in the 
production function) than the former. The data for both measures are from Conference 
Board & Groningen Growth & Development Centre, 2008. 
 
Log Yi (t-1) is the log of real GDP percapita of the working age population given in the 
previous year. This variable is used mainly for the purpose of testing for convergence. 
This is calculated in US$ 2000 constant in PPP to make it comparable across the board.  
 
Kit is domestic investments in the host country. Many studies have used Gross Fixed 
Capital Investments (GFCI henceforth) as proxy for domestic capital. However, we use 
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‘capital stock’ computed using Bosworth & Collins’ perpetual inventory model. 
Bosworth & Collins (2003) assumes that growth in capital services is proportional to the 
capital stock, which is estimated with a perpetual inventory model for 84 countries that 
represent 95% of the world’s GDP and 85% of the population, over a period of 40 years 
from 1960 to 2003. This includes all the Latin American countries which we use in our 
study except Barbados. First, we extend the capital stock for all the Latin countries in our 
sample following Bosworth and Collins (2003) perpetual inventory model till 2006 using: 
 
 
 
Where, K is the capital stock in previous year; I is the average of GFCI in t and t-1 years; 
d is depreciation rate, which is assumed to me 0.05%5 (same as Bosworth and Collins’ 
assumptions). The basic investment data of GFCI from 2003 to 2006 are taken from a 
World Bank study. For Barbados, which is not in the sample of Bosworth and Collin, the 
major problem was to compute the initial value of K. For this, we compare the basic 
investment to output ratio with nearest possible value of other countries in the sample to 
take the initial value of that country as proxy for Barbados’s initial K value6.  
 
FDIit is the FDI inflows measured in terms of log of total FDI inflows in the host country 
in a year. The reason behind selecting FDI inflows over stock is to measure the reaction 
of investors in terms of increase in inflows to changes in policy reforms. Stock fails to 
capture this effect because it is a mere accumulation of FDI inflows in each year. Also we 
do not intend to use net FDI inflows or stock because for most of the years the FDI 
outflows for Latin countries has been low in majority of the cases.  This apart, from 
economic model point of view it would be imperative to measure the impact of total FDI 
inflows on economic growth rather than net of inflows. The data for FDI inflows is in 
US$ current million from UNCTAD database on FDI. Using this data might encounter 
some estimation problems. For some countries in Africa in the initial years the FDI 
inflows is registered in negative values. This might be due to disinvestments or new 
investments being lower than the disinvested amount. Since some of the values are in 
negative usage of log becomes impossible and if the log is not used then the data may be 
skewed and can generate inconsistent results. To counter this problem, we make use of 
Busse & Hefeker (2006) method as follows: 
 
) 
 
Using this formula, we transform the negative values to adopt log format. 
                                                  
5 The rationale for selection 5% as depreciation rate is because usually in developed countries like USA the 
average life of industrial equipment and nonresidential buildings are 16 and 31 years, which leads to an 
annual depreciation of 10% and 3% respectively (Katz & Herman, 1997). Since Latin region is a mixture of 
developing and underdeveloped countries, we assume the average life of the equipment and machinery 
assets to be 25 years which leads to a depreciation rate of 7%. Usually majority of the capital stock is 
dominated with manufacturing sector which leads to an assumption of 5% depreciation rate. Alternatively, 
we also tried with 7% depreciation rate and there is not much change in the results.  
6 Generally the capital to output ratios is similar for countries using similar technologies and stages of 
development. This ratio is generally smaller for developing countries to developed countries. This ratio in 
the early stages of development will be lower and they gradually increase. 
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REFit is economic policy reforms of the host country. To quantify economic policy 
reforms and market liberalization, we make use of Economic Freedom Index constructed 
by Gwartney, Lawson & Easterly (2006) of Fraser institute. This index is ranked on the 
scale of 0 (not free) to 10 (totally free). The index captures the most objective measures 
of liberalization process. This index is comprehensive measure made up of five sub 
indices capturing: expenditure & tax reforms; property rights & legal reforms; trade 
reforms; reforms related to access to sound money; labour, business & credit reforms. 
 
PVit apart from the main variables of the growth equation, we also include some of the 
important policy variables which influence economic growth. These include: trade 
openness and inflation. Higher trade openness means greater the integration and higher 
the competitiveness. Finding support for trade openness affecting growth includes some 
of the prominent studies like: Barro & Lee (1994); Dollar (1992); Sachs & Warner 
(1995); Sala-i-Martin (1997); Bassanini et al. (2001); Barro & Sala-i-Martin (2004). To 
capture the trade openness we include (exports + imports)/GDP * 100. With respect to 
inflation, higher the value greater the macroeconomic instability (De Melo, 1997; Bruno 
& Easterly, 1998). The inflation rate is measured using the rate of growth of consumer 
price index. Data for both variables are obtained from WDI 2006. 
 
Apart from these two policy variables, we also include two more variables to capture 
macroeconomic vulnerability in Latin America. These include: natural resources and civil 
war. The “resource curse” hypothesis propounded by Sachs & Warner (1995) highlights 
that resource abundance impedes economic growth. Also, natural resources, more 
particularly fuel and oil are characterized by the cycle of boom and bust lead to exchange 
rate volatility and increase (decrease) in inflation, increasing macroeconomic uncertainty. 
However, the positive aspects of natural resources are that they contribute to larger 
portion of exports and thereby increasing the export earnings. To capture natural resource 
abundance we include the share of minerals, ores, fuel and oil exports / total exports 
collected from WTO. Similarly, we also include civil war for macroeconomic uncertainty 
(Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2008) which is a dummy coded with the value as 1 if there is a 
presence of civil war in the country and 0 otherwise7.  In addition, we also include: υi 
representing unobservable country-specific attributes affecting economic growth (country 
dummies) and εt capturing time-specific effects which vary according to time and affects 
economic growth (time dummies). 
 
3. Economic Growth, FDI & Reforms – Stylized Facts 
 
In this section an attempt is made to understand and present some of the important 
stylized facts with respect to reforms process, FDI inflows and output growth 
performance of 22 Latin American countries. We briefly examine the reforms conditions 
and the process of reforms by country and whether reforms have played the expected role 
to stimulate growth and attract FDI or otherwise.  
 
 
 
                                                  
7 The detailed information on data sources is given in annexure – 2.  
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3.1. Initial Conditions of Reforms: 
 
We begin with examining the initial conditions of reforms in Latin America. Our reforms 
index is an aggregate economic freedom index compiled by Gwartney, Lawson & 
Easterly (2006) of Fraser Institute. This is scored on a scale of 0 (no reforms) – 10 (full 
reforms). In its Latin American edition, the economic freedom index covers as many as 
22 countries. An increase in the score from the previous year signals the liberalization of 
economic policies on a whole. We include country’s overall policy reforms rather than 
concentrating only on specific policy issues. The main reason for this comprehensive 
measure is that, apart from growth performance, attracting FDI also depends on the 
interplay of various policy issues. The growth performance and attracting FDI would then 
be a result of a comprehensive policy changes but not of a particular sector reforms. 
 
Graph 2 
 
During our study period, the highest index score was recorded as 8 for Chile; followed by 
7.8 for El Salvador; and 7.5 for Costa Rica. Least reformed states in 2006 include: 5 for 
Venezuela, whose economic reforms score was 7 in 1980. Figure 2 illustrates a negative 
relationship between initial economic reforms in 1980 and the rate of growth of reforms 
over 1981 to 2006. As can be seen from graph 2, there is an inverse relationship between 
the initial level of economic reforms in 1980 and rate of change in the economic reforms 
occurred during the period 1981 to 2006. This inverse relationship suggests the case for 
convergence. It can also be inferred from the above figure that those countries which 
have already obtained a higher degree of economic reforms in 1980 had less potential to 
liberalize further. However, this argument may be valid in the case of some of the Latin 
American countries like Chile who started the process of reforms way back in 1970s.  
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3. 2. Reforms Process by Country: 
 
We now disaggregate the overall economic reforms index by country to show more 
explicitly the timing and the degree of economic reforms. In graph 3 we show for each 
country the level of its general reforms index at three points in time: 1980 – 1990; 1990 – 
2006; and 1980 – 2006. The average values of reforms index during these three periods is 
presented. There are some significant surprises in the figure. In particular, Chile, Panama, 
Costa Rica and El Salvador are the most reformed countries in the region which have 
highest average values during 1980 – 2006 (in order). While, other early reformers like 
Argentina, Colombia and Uruguay are lagging behind. Interestingly, the only early 
reformer, Chile is still leading the race. There are several reasons for this trend. First 
reason to an extent can be convergence in reforms process. Countries such as Panama, 
Costa Rica and El Salvador have began reforms much later compared to early reforming 
countries like Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, and Colombia. Perhaps this is the reason why 
the reforms in these countries are wholesale and come in package in comparison to 
selective reforms in early reforming countries. Second, countries like Argentina, Brazil, 
and Uruguay who adopted the reforms much earlier slowed down considerably in the late 
1990s due to macroeconomic and political crisis. For example: Argentina had a reforms 
score of over 7 during 1999, 2000 and 2001 but ended up with a score of 6 in 2006.  
 
Our next question is who were the major reformers at different points in time? As 
highlighted earlier, we took two points in time viz., 1980 – 1990 and 1991 – 2006. 
Average reforms values for each country was taken into consideration for comparison 
during both periods. During the period 1980 – 2006, major successful reforming country 
was interestingly, Venezuela. In comparison to other countries, Venezuelan reforms 
process was much higher. This was followed by Chile, Uruguay, Panama, Costa Rica and 
Barbados. The least reforming country of the 1980s was Nicaragua, Brazil and Peru. 
Interestingly, Brazil and Nicaragua remained least reforming countries even in 1990s. For 
the period 1991 – 2006, we find that Venezuela’s reforms have fallen back drastically, 
though it is still in contention in comparison to other countries Apart from Chile, Costa 
Rica and Panama, many other new players came into light during this period. A careful 
look at that graph shows that majority of the countries in the region have performed 
significantly well in the 1990s compared to their dismal performance in the 1980s. In 
contrast, the only country whose reforms have in fact declined in 1990s to 1980s was 
Venezuela. There are several reasons for this. First is its heavy dependence on natural 
resources exports which not only increases monopoly rents paving way for corruption, 
but also leading to ‘Dutch disease’. Second is political instability and drastic decline in 
institutional constraints and democratic accountability8. 
 
                                                  
8 For example: the political constraints index of Henisz (2004) measuring institutional constraints and 
democratic accountability shows that the institutional constraints in Venezuela have declined from a higher 
level of 0.75% in 1994 to 0.42% in 2004. This means, the ‘checks & balances’ in a democracy is 
significantly eroded. See Collier & Hoffler (2004) for more on importance of a healthy ‘checks & balances’ 
for a developing and under developed democratic country. 
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Graph 3 
 
3. 3. Levels & Changes of Reforms 
 
The changes of reforms from 1980 to 2006 are captured for each country in a three 
dimensional matrix table 1. We define arbitrarily three aspects of reforms: below average 
reforms which have a score between 0 – 3.5; average reformers whose score falls under 
3.6 – 6.5 and above average reformers where the score of reforms is above 6.6. Based on 
this we compare the reforms position of the countries in 2006 to 1980.  
 
 
Economic Reforms by Country (1980-2006)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Savador
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Trinidad & Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
Barbados
Reforms Index (0 - 10)
1991-2006 1980-1990 1980-2006
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Table 1: Levels & Changes of Reforms from 1980 to 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
1980 
2006 
 
Rate of Change 
1980 / 2006 
Below 
Average 
(0.0 – 3.5) 
Average 
(3.6 – 6.5) 
Above Average 
(6.6 – 10) 
 
Below Average 
(0.0 – 3.5) 
 
 
------- 
 
------- 
 
------- 
 
Average 
(3.6 – 6.5) 
 
 
 
------- 
Argentina; Barbados;  Brazil; 
Colombia; Dominican Republic; 
Ecuador;  Haiti; Nicaragua; Panama; 
Paraguay; Trinidad & Tobago;  
Chile; Costa Rica; Bolivia; 
El Savador; Gautemala; 
Hondarus; Jamaica; 
Mexicio; Peru; Uruguay   
Above Average 
(6.6 – 10) 
 
 
------- 
 
Venezuela  
 
------- 
Source: computed & compiled by authors 
 
From the table 1 we cannot confidently say that the reforms process in all countries has a 
degree of convergence. There is an amount of convergence in certain cases. But this 
cannot be attributed to all the countries. Countries which fall in the middle column of the 
table under “average” score are those countries whose position has not improved 
drastically in comparison to countries falling under fifth column of the table under 
“average – above average matrix”. The countries whose reforms scores were average in 
1980 improved their performance significantly and are in the category of above average 
in 2006. While some of the major countries like Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and 
Paraguay have remained average in 1980 and in 2006 too. The findings about major 
countries like: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay should not be mistaken for 
significant convergence, where countries which tend to relatively liberalize economies in 
1980 would introduce fewer additional reforms in future because the scores of economic 
reforms index of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, Panama in 2006 are much lower 
than countries falling in the category of above average in 2006. Hence, these results 
should be interpreted with caution. The only conclusion which can be drawn from this 
table is that these countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, and Panama) which 
started well in 1980 have lost their way in the middle and ended up with lower level of 
reforms for various reasons which are beyond the scope of this paper. As discussed 
previously, the only exception to the entire case is Venezuela, whose performance has 
come down from good to worse.  
 
3. 4.  Reforms, FDI & Economic growth 
 
Output growth performance is measured using output growth rate per worker highlighted 
in section 2. For an overall 594 observations, the output growth rate per worker has a 
mean of -0.01% with a standard deviation of 0.51% (see annexure 3). A simple 
correlation between output growth rate per worker and economic reforms demonstrate a 
very low correlation, r = 0.25 in our 594 sample observations. The scatter plot in figure 4 
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provides a first impression of the correlation between the output growth rate per worker 
and economic reforms. 
 
Graph 4 
 
Although the data points in this plot are affected by various other factors which we will 
control for in the following section in a more systematic analysis, clearly there seems to 
be a positive effect of reforms on growth. But the interesting point noteworthy is that the 
positive effect of reforms on growth is only marginal and not very high. The circle inside 
the graph captures those points (country-years) in which high reforms are not really 
yielding a higher economic growth. One reason for this could be due to half-hearted 
reforms.   
 
Similarly, we find in graph 5 the relationship between economic reforms and FDI 
inflows. This relationship is though positive, has many outliers. As seen inside the graph, 
we have two circles one above the straight line and another below. The circle covering 
the data points which are below the line shows that despite reforms FDI inflows are too 
low. But at same level of reforms or even to a lesser degree of reforms, FDI inflows are 
very high (see data points in circle above the line). This shows us that reforms though 
playing important role in attracting FDI, is not really “the” driving force behind attracting 
FDI inflows. There can be other exogenous factors like natural resources or higher rate of 
return which seems to attract FDI inflows. 
 
The effect of FDI inflows on output growth is also captured in scatter plot in figure 6. For 
an overall 594 observations, the Logged FDI inflows have a mean of 5.30 with standard 
deviation of 2.2 (see annexure 3). Simple correlation between the two demonstrate a 
lower, r = 0.25. The figure 6 show a positive relation between the level of FDI inflows 
and output growth rate per worker in Latin countries during 1980 to 2006 period. 
Relationship between Economic Policy Reforms & Economic Growth in 
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Graph 5 
 
However, this positive impact is only minimal and not as high as one would have 
expected, especially after these countries have undertaken significant policy reforms 
during the 1990s. The circle inside the graph shows that despite higher FDI inflows, 
output growth is very low. This also confirms that though FDI inflows are important, is 
not significantly affecting growth as expected (assuming other things constant).  
 
Graph 6 
 
 
 
Relationship between Economic Reforms & FDI in Latin America (1980 - 2006)
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4. Empirical Results & Discussion 
 
The sample of country-years that we examine in total make up of 594 observations.  The 
results of regression estimates using random effects method in assessing the impact of 
FDI inflows and policy reforms on output growth performance are presented in seven 
different models in table 2. We also control for Heteroskedasticity using Huber-White 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. The summary of data is 
provided in annexure 3. Before examining the direct effects of FDI on output growth 
performance, we first examine the existence of convergence in Latin American countries. 
The model 1 in table 2 shows that the lagged value of output per worker is significant and 
negative. This suggests convergence of income in Latin America. The results highlight 
the presence of “unconditional convergence”. Model 2 presents the estimated results of 
trivial regression where output per worker growth is exclusively explained by FDI 
inflows and conditional convergence (see second column of table 2). FDI inflows are 
significant and the sign is consistent with the theoretical predictions.  The coefficient 
value is small and shows that for every 1% increase in FDI lead to around 0.092% 
increase in output per worker growth in long run. The convergence variable still holds to 
its negative sign and is also statistically significant. Next, we include capital stock 
variable in model 3. We use this model as a benchmark throughout the study. The long 
run coefficient on FDI is positive and significant. For every 1% increase in FDI, leads to 
0.087% increase in output growth performance. In other words, holding at its mean value, 
increase in log FDI inflows by its highest value (log 10.4) would increase the economic 
growth rate in Latin American countries by 0.087%. But surprisingly we find negative 
sign for capital stock. However, capital stock remains statistically insignificant through 
out the models. This surprising result could be because of the “crowding out effect” of 
FDI. The correlation between the two models is only 0.45% (see annexure 4). This 
explains that there is some degree of crowding out effect of FDI.  
 
In model 4 of table 2, we include our second main variable, economic reforms index 
along with other control variables. We find that economic policy reforms are positive and 
have significant impact on output growth performance of Latin American countries (see 
model 4; table 2). For every 1% increase economic reforms index lead to 0.115% 
increase in growth of output per worker. On the other hand, though the positive sign and 
significance level of FDI still holds, the coefficient value has substantially declined. The 
coefficient value of FDI inflows declined from 0.090% in model 2 to 0.054% in model 4. 
This means that the output growth in Latin America is not only explained by FDI inflows, 
but there are also other significant factors that contribute to growth. Most important 
amongst them include economic policy reforms.  The comparison of coefficients between 
FDI inflows and policy reforms show some interesting trends. While both have positive 
effect on output growth performance, the impact is marginally higher with respect to 
policy reforms.  In model 5, we interact FDI with economic policy reforms to measure 
the conditional effects of reforms and FDI on economic growth. The interaction effect 
variable is found to be insignificant (see model 5; table 2). Though there is a positive 
effect of this variable on output growth performance, it remains insignificant irrespective 
of fixed effects of random effects estimations (fixed effects results not shown here, but 
provided on request). 
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Table 2: FDI & Economic growth equation function for Latin America 
 
Dependent Variable: Growth rate of Output per worker 
 
 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Random Random Random Random Random Random Random 
 
 
Constant 
5.4357*** 
(1.841) 
5.7143*** 
(1.795) 
7.5543*** 
(2.176) 
7.8139*** 
(2.223) 
9.0004*** 
(2.523) 
10.443*** 
(2.489) 
10.973*** 
(2.529) 
Log Output per worker (t – 1)  
(Income Convergence) 
-0.6014*** 
(0.203) 
-0.685*** 
(0.203) 
-0.6324*** 
(0.205) 
-0.7263*** 
(0.214) 
-0.8207*** 
(0.234) 
-1.0358*** 
(0.252) 
-1.0097*** 
(0.253) 
Log FDI Inflows 
____ 0.0902*** 
(0.030) 
0.0876*** 
(0.030) 
0.0543* 
(0.0305) 
0.0011 
(0.0597) 
____ ____ 
Log Domestic Capital  
____ ____ -0.1838 
(0.123) 
-0.1766 
(0.123) 
-0.1832 
(0.124) 
-0.1808 
(0.123) 
-0.1867 
(0.123) 
 
Economic Reforms 
____ ____ ____ 0.1147*** 
(0.040) 
0.0612 
(0.060) 
____ ____ 
 
Minerals Fuels Exports/Total Exports 
____ ____ ____ 0.0002 
(0.002) 
0.0006 
(0.002) 
0.0021 
(0.002) 
0.0015 
(0.002) 
Trade Openness 
____ ____ ____ 0.0005 
(0.002) 
0.0004 
(0.002) 
-0.0002 
(0.002) 
0.0001 
(0.002) 
Inflation Rate 
____ ____ ____ -3.47E-05 
(2.92E-05) 
-3.63E-05 
(2.79E-05) 
-3.86E-05 
(2.57E-05) 
-4.47E-05* 
(2.72E-05) 
Civil War presence 
____ ____ ____ -0.044 
(0.087) 
-0.075 
(0.088) 
-0.1200 
(0.083) 
-0.1709** 
(0.081) 
 
Log FDI Inflows X Economic Reforms 
____ ____ ____ ____ 0.0251 
(0.024) 
____ ____ 
Log FDI Inflows X 1980s 
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 0.0465 
(0.072) 
____ 
Log FDI Inflows X 1990s 
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 0.2206*** 
(0.072) 
____ 
Economic Reforms X 1980s 
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 0.0827* 
(0.045) 
____ 
Economic Reforms X 1990s 
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 0.1711*** 
(0.059) 
____ 
Log FDI inflows X Reforms X 1980s 
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 0.0185 
(0.013) 
Log FDI inflows X Reforms X 1990s 
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 0.0425*** 
(0.010) 
 
R-squared 0.2205 0.2412 0.2448 0.2640 0.2654 0.2802 0.2716 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1519 0.1728 0.1753 0.1888 0.1888 0.2037 0.1972 
F-statistic 3.2127 * 3.5287 * 3.5209 * 3.5090 * 3.4644 * 3.6614 * 3.648 * 
Number of Countries 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Total  Number of Observations 594 594 594 594 594 594 594 
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: *** Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level; * Significant at 10% 
confidence level. White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.  
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The coefficient value of FDI inflows is lower than economic reforms index. This shows 
that the impact of FDI on output growth performance is conditioned by economic policy 
reforms. Without economic policy reforms, the impact of FDI inflows on economic 
growth in Latin American countries is nil. 
 
Next, we examine how the effects of FDI and policy reforms may vary over time. 
Specifically we allow both FDI and policy reforms variables to have different effects 
over the periods of 1980 – 1990 (1980s) and 1991 – 2006 (1990s). For this purpose we 
create dummy variables for each time period and interact it with log FDI inflows, 
economic reforms index and the interactive term of FDI and reforms. Models 6 and 7 in 
table 2 present the estimation results. The coefficients of both FDI and policy reforms 
using both methods regain their positive signs. Some interesting findings emerge from 
these results. First, economic policy reforms are significant in both 1980s and 1990s, 
while FDI inflows are significant only in 1990s. Second, the coefficient values of both 
economic reforms and FDI inflows are higher in 1990s than 1980s. This is because the 
rate of growth in reforms and FDI inflows in 1990s compared to 1980s was higher in 
Latin America. The entire 1980s period is popularly called as “the lost decade” in the 
case of Latin America because of frequent macroeconomic turmoil led by oil and debt 
crisis, which actually caused the FDI inflows to crowd out towards Asia. In model 7, we 
find that the interactive term of FDI and reforms in 1980s and 1990s is positive, but 
statistically significant only in 1990s. The coefficient and significance level in the two 
periods show that the complimentary effect of reforms and FDI inflows on output growth 
performance worked well in the 1990s to 1980s.  
 
Table 3: Output growth gains from FDI and Economic Policy Reforms in Latin region 
 
Variables 
 
(full period) 
1980 - 2006  
 (1980s) 
1980 - 1990 
 (1990s) 
1991 - 2006 
 
FDI inflows 
 
0.054 
 
0.101 
 
0.322 
 
Economic Reforms 0.115 0.198 0.369 
 
FDI  X  Reforms 0.061 0.080 0.123 
Source: computed & compiled by authors 
 
The table 3 gives a brief summary of the temporal pattern of the effects of both FDI and 
economic policy reforms on economic growth rate of Latin countries9. These results 
indicate that both FDI and policy reforms has become increasingly important, especially 
in the post 1990s period. Though similar such argument can be made for the interactive 
model, the partial effects coefficient jump from 1980s to 1990s is relatively lower than 
that of FDI inflows and policy reforms variables. Liberalizing the economies was the 
most rewarding in Latin regions (reforms in 1990s increased growth by 0.369% 
                                                  
9 The partial effects for different time periods are calculated as follows: The coefficient values of the 1980s 
are added to the coefficient of the basic model. Likewise, the coefficient values of the 1990s are added to 
the new values obtained previously for the 1980s. 
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compared to 0.198% in 1980s). In the case of FDI, the partial effects in 1980s were only 
0.101%. But in 1990s this surged to 0.322%. The interactive effect of FDI and reforms is 
lower for the whole sample period, but is marginally during the 1990s. Its impact on 
output growth performance is 0.123% in the 1990s compared to 0.080% in the 1980s.  
 
One credible recommendation which can be derived from these results is that both FDI 
and reforms individually are important for economic growth. However, reforms are not 
able to make a greater impact on FDI inflows as expected. This perhaps also mean that 
that there other significant factors which are driving FDI into the region. The 
governments in Latin America should strive hard to initiate much more tougher reforms 
which would not only be growth enhancing but would also play very important role in 
attracting much needed FDI into the countries. The growth effects of FDI are well known 
in terms of technology diffusion. Hence, the effective way of attracting FDI into the 
region, given its costs and locational disadvantages apart from natural resource 
endowments in few countries, is by implementing policies that will make the host 
countries an attractive FDI destination.    
 
With respect to control variables, the negative sign of log output per worker highlights 
the effect of income convergence even after introducing various control variables. The 
negative impact of domestic capital stock on output growth performance once again 
confirms the divergent results in the literature with regard to the impact of domestic 
capital vis-à-vis foreign capital on economic growth in developing countries. Firebaugh 
(1992) found that the impact of foreign capital on economic growth is lower than 
domestic capital. Similar such results are found by Dixon & Boswell (1996) who argue 
that if the foreign capital is less productive than the domestic investments and if the 
former replaces the later, then its impact on growth is bound to be smaller. Their findings 
however were self defeating because despite their argument that foreign capital is 
detrimental to economic growth, they failed to find any significant effect of domestic 
capital. Moving further, we could not find any evidence of ‘resource curse’ hypothesis 
for Latin America. The impact of trade openness on economic growth is positively 
insignificant but the coefficient values are lower10. Both the growth destabilizing 
variables (inflation rate and presence of civil war) have significant negative impact on 
output growth performance in Latin America during the period 1980 – 2006. 
 
However, the coefficient estimates in these models may likely to be biased. First, the 
relationship between economic growth rate and FDI inflows can probably be bi-
directional. Our main interest is to examine the hypothesis whether FDI inflows has any 
positive effect on economic output growth or not in Latin America. But some also argue 
that a growing economy can attract more FDI than a stagnant or slow growing economy. 
We do agree with this argument often voiced in the literature because of the uneven 
distribution of FDI inflows in the developing countries. While select group of growing 
economies like the East Asia attracts large amount of FDI inflows followed by South 
Asia and Middle East and on the other hand, the Latin America and African regions 
receive lesser share. Second, the bi-directional problem in earlier models may also arise 
                                                  
10 It is important to note that a rigid trade regime may also encourage FDI inflows because of the cost 
associated with trade. Usually this is labeled as “tariff jumping FDI”. For more, see Jun & Singh (1996). 
 21
from the causal relationship between the economic reforms and the economic growth 
rate. If economic policy reforms cause good growth performance, then the reverse may 
also be true that good growth performance is also good for economic reforms.  
 
A common statistical approach in dealing with causal and reverse causal bias is to use 
instrumental variables. It is always a matter of supposition whether the particular 
instrument variables selected would reduce biases or introduce new biases into the 
models. Also, instrument variable method under two stage least squares method can 
reduce the endogenity bias but will not completely eliminate the problem. To tackle this 
we use GMM estimation of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) 
than simple GMM of Arellano and Bond (1991), that exploits the stationarity restrictions 
and give more robust results. Moreover, Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the 
differenced GMM estimation has poor finite sample properties when the lagged levels of 
the series are weakly correlated with the subsequent first-differences. Therefore, the 
efficiency gains of using the system GMM over the may be higher. The validity of 
instruments that give a set of over-identifying restrictions has been verified with the 
standard Hansen test, which confirms that in all cases our set of instruments is valid. 
Furthermore, the AR(1) and AR(2) tests, that check the hypothesis of absence of serial 
correlation, are also presented. The standard errors of coefficients are robust to 
Heteroskedasticity. 
 
Table 4: Robustness Check: GMM estimation 
 
Dependent Variable: Growth rate of Output per worker 
 
 
Variables 
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
GMM-SYS GMM-SYS GMM-SYS GMM-SYS 
 
 
Constant 
1.8941* 
(0.6155) 
2.0453* 
(0.6061) 
0.4465 
(0.3594) 
-0.4218 
(0.4511) 
Growth rate of Output per Worker (t – 1) 
0.3485* 
(0.0332) 
0.3173* 
(0.0341) 
0.3173* 
(0.0284) 
0.1151* 
(0.0287) 
Log Output per worker (t – 1)  
(Income Convergence) 
-0.2107* 
(0.068) 
-0.2563* 
(0.0683) 
-0.1711* 
(0.0463) 
-0.1017*** 
(0.0531) 
Log FDI Inflows 
____ 0.0488* 
(0.0155) 
0.0784* 
(0.0117) 
0.0431* 
(0.015) 
Log Domestic Capital  
____ ____ 0.0532*  
(0.02) 
0.0620* 
(0.020) 
 
Economic Reforms 
____ ____ ____ 0.0669** 
(0.0269) 
 
Minerals Fuels Exports / Total Exports 
____ ____ ____ -0.0036* 
(0.0013) 
Trade Openness 
____ ____ ____ 0.0005 
(0.002) 
Inflation Rate 
____ ____ ____ 1.75e-06 
(0.0000) 
Civil War presence 
____ ____ ____ -0.0408 
(0.0750) 
 
J-Stat 398.84 403.89 1219.71 1217.14 
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AR1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.932 0.721 0.130 0.117 
Number of Countries 22 22 22 22 
Total  Number of Observations 572 572 572 572 
Note: J-stat is Hansen’s test for over identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) test refer to the test for the null of no first-order and 
second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals. P-values are reported for the Hansen, AR(1) and AR(2) tests. *** 
Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level * Significant at 10% confidence level. Heteroskedasticity-
Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis 
 
The results of GMM show some interesting trends. First, our estimate of convergence 
variable is about four times higher than the one estimated by random effects 
specification. We observe that the random effects method gives an estimate of 
unconditional convergence variable that is -0.60% (-0.39%) higher than the one found in 
GMM estimations (see model 8 in table 4). Similarly, the benchmark model of GMM 
(model 9 in table 4) gives an estimate of conditional convergence variable that is -0.17% 
(-0.46%) lower than the estimates of random effects model. Next, the random effects 
model representing FDI inflows treats correctly the correlated individual effects but fails 
to account for potential endogenity. The estimated coefficient value of FDI inflows is 
now smaller in GMM than the one estimated by random affects method (see model 11). 
Similar conclusions are drawn for economic reforms variable. The GMM estimate of 
reforms is 0.06% compared to 0.11% in random effects (see model 11). These results 
suggests that failing to account for endogenity biases the coefficient values upwards and 
thereby exaggerating the claims of stronger effect of FDI and reforms on output growth 
performance. The validity of the moment restrictions is checked by Hansen’s test fail to 
reject the null hypothesis. In light of these results, the moment conditions underlying the 
GMM estimation are supported. At the same time, the fact that there is evidence of first 
order but not second order autocorrelation implies that the models are correctly specified 
in levels, as expected.  
 
4. 1. Robustness check 
 
We ran several tests of sensitivity. First, we ran the baseline model with one lagged 
values for all the independent variables. There is not much change in the results. The 
coefficient values of FDI and reforms retain their positive signs with same significance 
level as in baseline model 1. Their impact on economic output growth is also similar to 
that of baseline model. Moreover, with respect of other control variables we do not find 
any significant changes in their results11.   
 
Second, we calculate the share of FDI inflows of each country with that of total FDI 
inflows of the region. We exclude those countries whose share in the region is above 10% 
consistently for a period of at least 10 years in the total sample years. Following this 
method, we found the following countries meeting this criterion: Brazil, Mexico, Chile 
and Colombia. We re-ran the results with random effects estimation first by removing 
Brazil and Mexico from the original list of sample. The results are presented in annexure 
5. The results highlight the importance of the role played by FDI inflows in these 22 
countries. However, the impact of domestic capital is still negative. The importance of 
                                                  
11 Results are not shown here due to brevity. They will be provided on request.  
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economic reforms too still holds on (see model 12). In model 13, we also included the 
interaction effect between FDI and reforms. The results display similar pattern observed 
for full sample countries. Though the interaction depicts complementary effect, it still 
remains insignificant. Higher coefficient value of economic reforms highlights the 
importance of economic policy reforms, if FDI were to make a significant impact on 
economic growth in Latin America. In models 14 and 15, we exclude Chile and 
Colombia along with Brazil and Mexico. There are no significant changes in the results.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The study deals with the relationship between FDI inflows, economic reforms, the 
interaction between the two and output growth per worker using the aggregate production 
function augmented with the aforementioned factors for 22 Latin American countries 
over 1980-2006 period. We have used different econometric panel data techniques to 
explain the pointed out relationship. These include: random-effects specification to 
address possible country specific unobserved heterogeneity and GMM estimation to deal 
with potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables.  
 
The major findings of the study are: First, the results show the importance of FDI inflows 
and policy reforms on economic output growth. Both are found to be positive and 
significant. However, the impact of policy reforms is found to be much stronger than FDI 
inflows. Also, the lower coefficient value of FDI inflows shows that the positive effect is 
only marginal. The interactive effect between FDI and policy reforms though found 
positive remained insignificant in different estimation techniques. This is because of 
two reasons. One, other things being constant, there are other exogenous factors like 
natural resources which are the drivers in attracting FDI inflows excluding policy reforms 
alone. Two, as highlighted in stylized facts, majority of the countries which began 
economic reforms in 1980 remained half-hearted and their performance during the whole 
period (1980 - 2006) was unimpressive. Second, we also examined the different period 
effects of FDI and Policy reforms on output growth performance. For this purpose we 
created dummy variables coding for 1980s (1980 - 1990) and 1990s (1991 - 2006) and 
interacted them with FDI inflows and policy reforms index. Both the interactions show 
significant positive impact on output growth performance only during the 1990s. This is 
largely due to the fact that majority of the Latin countries have initiated drastic policy 
changes only after early 1990s. These results also highlight that foreign investors reward 
countries implementing economic policy reforms  
 
One credible recommendation which comes from this study is that both FDI and reforms 
are important for economic growth in Latin America. However, reforms are not able to 
make a greater impact on FDI inflows would mean that that there other significant factors 
which are driving FDI into the region. But, our results have also shown that if 
governments initiate higher reforms as happened in the 1990s, the rewards would follow. 
Thus the governments in Latin America should strive hard to initiate much more tougher 
reforms which would not only be growth enhancing but would also play very important 
role in attracting much needed FDI into the region. The growth effects of FDI are well 
known in terms of technology diffusion and employment generation. Hence, the effective 
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way of attracting FDI into the region, given its costs and locational disadvantages apart 
from natural resource endowments in few countries, is by implementing policies that will 
make the host countries an attractive FDI destination.    
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ANNEXURES 
 
 
Annexure 1: Countries under Study 
 
Argentina Dominican Republic Jamaica Trinidad & Tobago 
Bolivia Ecuador Mexico Uruguay 
Brazil El Salvador Nicaragua Venezuela 
Chile Guatemala Panama Barbados 
Colombia Haiti Paraguay   
Costa Rica Honduras Peru   
 
 
 
Annexure 2: Data Sources 
 
Variables  Data Source 
Output per worker growth rate  
Conference Board & Groningen Growth & Development Centre 
Total Economy Database, 2008 
Log (FDI inflows) FDI statistics 2007, UNCTAD 
Log (Domestic capital stock) World Development Indicators, 2007; World Bank 
Economic Reforms Index Economic Freedom Index, Fraser Institute 
Oil Exports share Trade Statistics, World Trade Organization 
Trade Openness World Development Indicators, 2007; World Bank 
Inflation rate World Development Indicators, 2007; World Bank 
Civil War presence dummy Upssala / PRIO, 2008 
 
 
 
Annexure 3: Descriptive Statistics  
 
Variables 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum 
 Standard 
Deviation 
 
Observations Countries 
Output per worker growth rate -0.01 0.02 2.04 -3.20 0.51 594 22 
Log (Output per worker (t-1)) 9.05 9.41 10.68 5.22 1.14 594 22 
Log (FDI inflows) 5.30 5.30 10.40 0.00 2.22 594 22 
Log (Domestic capital stock) 12.52 12.76 18.95 6.19 2.94 594 22 
Economic Reforms Index 5.63 5.72 8.00 1.72 1.12 594 22 
Oil Exports share 24.91 11.41 97.89 0.00 28.01 594 22 
Trade Openness 63.95 56.05 198.77 11.55 32.93 594 22 
Inflation rate 81.02 11.71 12339.27 -11.45 579.03 594 22 
Civil War presence dummy 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.36 594 22 
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Annexure 4: Correlation Matrix  
 
  
Log (Output per 
worker (t-1)) 
Log (FDI 
inflows) 
Log (Domestic 
capital) 
Economic 
Reforms  
Oil 
Exports  
Trade 
Openness 
Inflation 
rate 
Civil War 
dummy 
Log (Output per worker (t-1)) 1.00               
Log (FDI inflows) 0.33 1.00             
Log (Domestic capital stock) 0.35 0.45 1.00           
Economic Reforms Index -0.04 0.38 0.02 1.00         
Oil Exports share 0.43 0.21 0.32 -0.08 1.00       
Trade Openness -0.43 -0.13 -0.08 0.36 -0.07 1.00     
Inflation rate 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.20 0.10 -0.10 1.00   
Civil War presence dummy 0.01 -0.11 0.09 -0.32 -0.06 -0.29 -0.01 1.00 
 
 
Annexure 5: Robustness check 
 
Dependent Variable: Growth rate of Output per worker 
 
 
Variables 
Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Random Random Random Random 
 
 
Constant 
7.486995*** 
(2.240) 
9.328382*** 
(2.640) 
8.350613*** 
(2.773) 
9.305733*** 
(3.106) 
Log Output per worker (t – 1)  
(Income Convergence) 
-0.695439*** 
(0.217) 
-0.843130*** 
(0.241) 
-0.767394*** 
(0.251) 
-0.846743*** 
(0.273) 
Log FDI Inflows 
0.058269* 
(0.032) 
-0.026490 
(0.071) 
0.052994* 
(0.032) 
0.003836 
(0.072) 
Log Domestic Capital Formation 
-0.181324 
(0.127) 
-0.191766 
(0.131) 
-0.217544 
(0.146) 
-0.219280 
(0.148) 
 
Economic Reforms 
0.120300*** 
(0.042) 
0.039941 
(0.065) 
0.122245*** 
(0.042) 
0.075381 
(0.066) 
Log FDI Inflows X Economic Reforms 
------ 0.039275 
(0.029) 
------ 0.022937 
(0.029) 
 
Minerals Fuels Exports / Total Exports 
-0.000493 
(0.002) 
-0.000278 
(0.002) 
0.000386 
(0.002) 
0.000343 
(0.002) 
Trade Openness 
0.000633 
(0.002) 
0.000558 
(0.002) 
0.000829 
(0.002) 
0.000784 
(0.002) 
Inflation Rate 
-3.44E-05 
(3.15E-05) 
-3.64E-05 
(3.00E-05) 
-4.31E-05 
(3.36E-05) 
-4.36E-05 
(3.27E-05) 
Civil War presence 
-0.040794 
(0.097) 
-0.083340 
(0.096) 
-0.047059 
(0.098) 
-0.071817 
(0.096) 
 
R-squared 0.264979 0.267814 0.257387 0.258378 
Adjusted R-squared 0.184822 0.186292 0.170121 0.169314 
F-statistic 3.30576 * 3.28518 * 2.94946 * 2.90106 * 
Number of Countries 20 20 18 18 
Total  Number of Observations 540 540 486 486 
Country & Year Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Note: *** Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level; * Significant at 10% 
confidence level. White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.  
